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Abstract
This article contextualizes the conditions of rural “connectivity” in the Canadian Arctic. It examines
the emergence of satellites, fibre optic cables, and intranets as modes of social infrastructure at the
outset of the twenty-first century. At present, Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon are
all at a complicated confluence in that their current and inadequate telecommunications
infrastructures are in the process of being renegotiated, re-designed, and re-allotted across civic,
governmental, and corporate interests. The article shows how it is at sites of friction that the
overlapping if fading legacies of systems-based thinking are emerging: satellites orbiting over fibre
optic cable lines; corporate actors competing rather than coordinating with government agencies; and
neoliberal rationales of mapping, division, and speed creating disjointed local markets. More broadly,
these sites also demonstrate how indigenous forms of “connection” across the globe are increasingly
experiencing telecommunications’ lags and temporal disjunctures that are having very material effects
on their supposedly post-colonial lives.
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Operation Nanook 
 
In August of 2009, “Exercise Operation Nanook,” 1  an annual Canadian 
government-sponsored military training initiative took place in and around Iqaluit, 
the capital city of the territory of Nunavut. On the 22nd of the month, Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper, then-Defense Minister Peter McKay, and Commander 
Alex Grant, assembled on the port bow of the HMCS Toronto, stationed in 
Frobisher Bay. In a video clip of the occasion,2 a clear blue sky hangs above 
them. In the middle distance stand the impeccably placed Canadian Coast Guard 
ship the Pierre Radisson and HMCS Cornerbrook, one of Canada’s four 
submarines. Seemingly on cue, three F-18 fighter jets in formation cruise by the 
three men. Seeing the event in real time, rather than through the various 
photographs that have captured the staging in the national press, emphasizes the 
symbolic, quite nearly propagandistic dimensions (and import) that the current 
Canadian government is placing on Arctic sovereignty and its demonstration 
through military presence. The behind-the-scene nature of the clip also gets at the 
unseen underpinnings of Operation Nanook as a whole. While it was widely 
considered a “successful” demonstration of Canadian search and rescue capacity, 
military ability, and the government’s general ease of access and mobility in the 
Arctic more broadly, the operation also signaled the significant inadequacies of 
the country’s northern telecommunications infrastructure. During an exercise 
involving hundreds of soldiers, emergency responders, and other government 
personnel, their communications activity overwhelmed and immobilized Iqaluit’s 
telecommunications network.      
 
---- 
 
Key  
 
Over the past number of years, USB keys have been circulating around the Arctic 
at an increasing rate, both via airmail and on the bodies of corporate and 
government personnel. The nexus of high-cost bandwidth in northern Canada and 
the increasing prevalence of data-intensive government and corporate services 
supported by updatable software programs, are turning Arctic telecommunications 
                                                        
1
 “Operation Nanook,” National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, accessed 
March 12, 2014, http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-
recurring/opnanook.page#tab-1391073900791-5. 
2
 “Frobisher Bay Fly Past,” David Akin, youtube.com, accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www. youtube.com/watch?v=9m96k_2swUI. 
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data transfer into a material mode of transportation. Chris Kalluk, an employee of 
Nunavut Tungavik Incorporated, the territory’s cultural and economic 
organization based in Cambridge Bay, relates how his organization, instead of 
auto-updating their software, rents server space in Edmonton, a city in northern 
Alberta, downloads the necessary updates there, and has a local colleague mail a 
USB key to Cambridge Bay. 3  Nunavut’s newly developed on-line driver’s 
licensing system faces significant delays in issuing new licenses as, due to 
bandwidth limitations, driver information cannot be sent over the internet. Rather, 
USB keys with the necessary driver data are sent via airmail. As Kathleen 
Lausman, a deputy minister in Nunavut’s Department of Community and 
Government Services, put it: “We have a state-of-the-art vehicle pulled by a team 
of dogs.”4  
 
---  
 
Anomaly/Outage  
 
At 6:36 am on October 6th, Nunavut and parts of the Northwest Territories and the 
Yukon went dark. 5  For sixteen hours, telecommunications services were 
nonexistent for the region’s resident population. The outage was due to a 
malfunction on Telesat Canada’s Anik F2 satellite—a “technical anomaly” in the 
company’s estimation. Long distance and local phone services, the internet, 
cellular connections, and automated banking services were all unavailable. Many 
banks closed for the day as the sole connection between northern branch locations 
and southerly headquarters had been rendered inoperative. Retail debit and credit 
transactions could not be processed. Airlines decided to ground flights departing 
from Nunavut due to the loss of radar and weather services. Without fibre optic 
landline connections, Nunavut and the extra-metropolitan regions of the 
Northwest Territories and the Yukon are all satellite dependent. Nunavut’s state 
                                                        
3
  Omar El Akkad, “Fast, affordable Internet? The North is still waiting,” The Globe and 
Mail, December 10, 2013, accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/breakthrough/fast-affordable-inter 
net-the-north-is-still-waiting/article15855643/. 
4
  “Canada’s Arctic a ‘telecommunications backwater:’ report,” Nunatsiaq Online, 
August 30, 2011, accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674canadas_arctic_a_telecommunicati
ons_backwater_report/. 
5
 “Northern telecom service restored after 16-hour Telesat Canada satellite glitch,” 
Nunatsiaq Online, October 6, 2011, accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674telesat_canada_screw_up_knocks_
out_northern_telcoms/. 
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of tele (at a distance) disconnection, prompted Premier Eva Aariak to ask the 
Government of Nunavut to go into emergency mode, which entailed having 
essential services activate their iridium satellite phones in order to establish 
alternate channels of communication. For the duration of the outage, the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation’s radio service was transformed into “Nunavut’s 
communications lifeline” as it was the most readily available means of reaching 
all of the territory’s communities.6 The outage was caused by Telesat Canada 
losing control of the Anik F2 satellite, having it accidentally shift its orientation 
and turn away from Nunavut. The Anik F2, Anik F1R and Anik F3 are the three 
satellites upon which northern Canada is dependent.  
 
----  
 
Collapse  
 
NEWS: Nunavik November 06, 2012 - 6:03 am 
Lousy telephone service puts Nunavik at risk, doctor says 
“It’s as if the telecommunications network in the region was beginning to 
collapse” 
“We call, we wait, nothing happens. It’s like we’re suspended in outer space. Or 
sometimes a loud noise blasts our eardrum. At other times, it’s the ‘South’ 
calling: the line rings. Hello? Hello? No one. But the line rings and rings again 
later. Without call display, there’s no way to know who is trying to call,” [Dr. 
François] Prévost said.7 
---- 
 
Flux 
 
Canada’s northern telecommunications infrastructure is in a state of flux. With 
new federally-subsidized satellites slated for launch in the next five to ten years, 
having the express goal of targeting and servicing the country’s Arctic regions; 
the installation of more comprehensive fibre optic cable networks on the near if 
still tenuous horizon; alternative modes of telecommunications production, 
distribution, and consumption being created on the ground in the Arctic, largely 
                                                        
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Jane George, “Lousy telephone service puts Nunavik at risk, doctor says,” Nunatsiaq 
Online, November 6, 2012, accessed March 12, 2014, 
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674lousy_telephone_service_puts_nun
avik_at_risk_doctor_says/. 
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by indigenous actors; and, finally, the ongoing renegotiation of existing corporate 
and government telecommunications regulatory regimes a recurring reality, this 
state of flux signals to what extent Arctic telecommunications infrastructures are a 
matter of concern for the region’s resident population, federal and territorial 
government personnel, agencies, services, and programs, and regional corporate 
actors, from multinational mining conglomerates to locally-owned tour operators. 
This constellation of issues, actors, geographies, and interests, demonstrates to 
what extent infrastructures can be contested ground across civic, political, and 
ideological domains. As Susan Leigh Star would have it, this makes of 
infrastructures both “ecological” and “relational” objects of study in that they 
point to the distributed constituencies, that are often local and agonistic, that such 
seemingly mundane and invisible pipes, road networks, and telecommunications 
systems subtend. “The image becomes more complicated,” as Star writes, “when 
one begins to investigate large-scale technical systems in the making, or to 
examine the situations of those who are not served by a particular infrastructure.”8 
In this sense, I am working out from the importance of “relation” in so much 
systems-based thinking, and arguing that infrastructures tend towards “open,” 
quasi-ecological systems of emergence and instability rather than cybernetic loops 
and circuits.9 At present, Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and the Yukon are 
all at just such a complicated confluence in that their current and inadequate 
telecommunications infrastructures are in the process of being renegotiated, re-
designed, and re-allotted across civic, governmental, and corporate interests. The 
question of who will be served by these restructuring efforts is an open one that I 
will put under investigation here. 
  A recent body of largely outstanding scholarly work has addressed what 
could be thought of as the expanded field of communicative practices and 
protocols of which infrastructure is increasingly an integral part. These range 
across analyses of infrastructural systems,10 satellites,11 and meteorological data.12 
                                                        
8
 Susan Leigh Star, “The Ethnography of Infrastructure,” American Behavioral Scientist, 
43 (3) (November 1999): 380. 
9
 To some extent, this is a return to the biological systems mapped by Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy in Modern Theories of Development: An Introduction to Theoretical 
Biology, trans. by J.H. Woodger (London: Oxford University Press, 1933).  
10
 See Lisa Gitelman, ed., “Raw Data” is an Oxymoron (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2013); Jeremy Packer and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley, eds., Communication Matters: 
Materialist Approaches to Media, Mobility and Networks (London: Routledge, 2012); 
Lisa Parks, “Around the Antenna Tree: The Politics of Infrastructural Visibility,” Flow 
TV 9(9) (2009), http://flowtv.org/2010/03/flow-favorites-around-the-antenna-tree-the-
politics-of-infrastructural-visibilitylisa-parks-uc-santa-barbara/; Mimi Sheller, 
“Infrastructures of the Imagined Island: Software, Mobilities and the Architecture of 
Caribbean Paradise,” Environment and Planning A 41 (2009): 1386-1403; Nicole 
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While this work has been generative in my own thinking on the ways in which 
infrastructural systems develop, coalesce, and establish regimes of signification 
and material access, they have often not directly addressed the ways in which 
infrastructures, to return to Star, are sited ecological-relational practices, and this 
might predominantly pertain to telecommunications infrastructures in the Arctic 
region. While much of Star’s work, and that undertaken with Karen Ruhleder in 
particular, 13  has focused on the relationships between types of labour, 
technological frameworks, and infrastructural systems, it nonetheless marks the 
important ways in which infrastructures are embedded in given social practices 
and technologies; become transparent via recurrent deployment and extend their 
reach beyond a phenomenon of single use; create forms of learned membership; 
establish links with preexisting modes of practice in a given system; embody 
regulated standards; telescope both backwards and forwards to interact with past 
and future systems; become visible in moments of breakdown; and signal the 
ways in which their forms of organization overshoot a single agency of control, 
thus incorporating incremental and diffuse forms of change.14  
 My primary goal here is to situate these contested characteristics of 
telecommunications infrastructures as they pertain to the Arctic as an emergent 
site of regional, national, and transnational connection. I aim to describe the sites 
                                                                                                                                                       
Starosielski, “‘Warning: Do Not Dig’: Negotiating the Visibility of Critical 
Infrastructures,” Journal of Visual Culture 11(1) (2012): 38-57, “Critical Nodes, 
Cultural Networks: Re-mapping Guam’s Cable Infrastructure,” Amerasia 37(3) (2012): 
18-27, and “Beaches, Fields, and other Network Environments,” Octopus Journal 5 
(2011): 1-7; Nicole Starosielski, Braxton Soderman, and Cris Cheek, eds. “Network 
Archaeology [Special Issue],” Amodern 2 (2013), http://amodern.net/issues/amodern-2-
network-archaeology/.  
11 See Lisa Parks, Cultures in Orbit: Satellites and the Televisual (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005), “Earth Observation and Signal Territories: Studying U.S. 
Broadcast Infrastructure through Historical Network Maps, Google Earth, and 
Fieldwork,” Canadian Journal of Communication 38(3) (2013): 285-307; Lisa Parks 
and James Schwoch, eds., Down to Earth: Satellite Technologies, Industries, and 
Cultures (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2012); Chris Russill, ed., 
“Earth-Observing Media [Special Issue],” Canadian Journal of Communication 38(3) 
(2013).  
12
 See Chris Russill and Zoe Nyssa, “The Tipping Point Trend in Climate Change 
Communication,” Global Environmental Change 19(3) (2009): 336-344; Chris Russill, 
“Forecast Earth: Hole, Index, Alert,” Canadian Journal of Communication 38(3) 
(2013): 421-442. 
13
 See Susan Leigh Star and Karen Ruhleder, “Steps Toward an Ecology of 
Infrastructure: Design and Access for Large Information Spaces,” Information Systems 
Research 7(1) (1996): 111-134. 
14
 Star, “The Ethnography of Infrastructure,” 381-382.  
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of “friction” into which these states of communicative emergence are cohering, 
whether they pertain to extractive industries such as iron ore mining or the 
changeable constitution of on-the-land indigenous ontologies. As Anna Tsing 
writes: 
Speaking of friction is a reminder of the importance of interaction 
in defining movement, cultural form, and agency. Friction is not 
just about slowing things down. Friction is required to keep global 
power in motion. It shows us (as one advertising jingle put it) 
where the rubber meets the road. Roads are a good image for 
conceptualizing how friction works: Roads create pathways that 
make motion easier and more efficient, but in doing so they limit 
where we go. The ease of travel they facilitate is also a structure of 
confinement. Friction inflects historical trajectories, enabling, 
excluding, and particularizing.15   
In a first section, “Indigene,” I examine the Digital Indigenous Democracy 
project, based in Nunavut, and its role in the approval of the Baffinland iron ore 
mine. In the next section, “Satellite Futures,” I consider the role such corporations 
as Telesat Canada are playing in the establishment of “local” conditions of 
broadband connectivity in the Arctic. Finally, in “Incidental Connection,” I 
describe the currently proposed creation of an extensive fibre optic network 
across eleven communities in Nunavut by Arctic Fibre Incorporated, with this last 
section opening onto a concluding note on how we can go about studying both 
these infrastructural materialities and conditions of the present with a view to 
establishing more coherent anthropological approaches to these sites of 
connection.  
While each section offers an Operation Nanook-style scenography of the 
actors and issues at play in each seemingly distinct geographic region and 
timeframe, they nonetheless seek to cohere into emblematic sites of “friction” that 
demonstrate how infrastructural systems constitute emergent relationships across 
a number of agonistic constituencies that are marking the expanded field of the 
Canadian communications landscape. It is at these sites of friction that the 
overlapping if fading legacies of systems-based thinking emerge: satellites 
orbiting over fibre optic cable lines; corporate actors competing rather than 
coordinating with government agencies; and neoliberal rationales of mapping, 
division, and speed creating disjointed local markets. More broadly, these sites 
demonstrate how indigenous forms of “connection” across the globe are 
                                                        
15
 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 6. 
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increasingly experiencing telecommunications’ lags and temporal disjunctures 
that are having very material effects on their supposedly post-colonial lives.  
 
---- 
 
Indigene 
 
The Digital Indigenous Democracy (DID) network was launched in 2012 by 
Isuma TV.16 The network was created by Norman Cohn and Zacharias Kunuk, the 
latter best known as the director of Atanarjuat (2001). DID is a networked media 
platform designed to foster Inuit-forms of consensus building in the Arctic, 
though largely operating at present only in Nunavut. The project was launched in 
response to an Environmental Review (ER) of the proposed Baffinland Iron 
Mines Corporation mine site at Mary’s River on North Baffin Island, which, if 
approved, would become one of the largest open-pit iron ore mines in the world.17 
In order to facilitate the timely and transparent undertaking of the ER and the 
necessary sharing of information that this entails amongst the communities 
affected by the mine, Isuma launched the DID as part of its Angiqatigingniq 
Internet Network (AIN), a media platform operating across community radio, 
local television, DIY filmmaking, and two-way high-speed internet. With 
typically low and costly speeds of broadband access in the majority of these 
communities, DID installs mediaplayers in each of the seven communities 
impacted by the ER that then stream Inuktitut-language Isuma TV programs, 
facilitate the uploading of user-generated content, and, across its other media 
platforms, informs the collective process of community consultation. The ultimate 
goal of the consensus process is a “multimedia Human Rights Impact 
Assessment” that will determine, in part, the costs and benefits of the Baffinland 
mine to and for the residents around Mary’s River.18 While, presumably, the AIN 
will continue to operate beyond the completion of the ER process, the work of the 
network raises some important questions around the relationships between 
                                                        
16
 Digital Indigenous Democracy, “About”, accessed March 12, 2014, 
www.isuma.tv/en/DID/About. 
17
 With the pace of northern resource development increasing, the twin poles of 
negotiation and convenience primarily characterize the relationship between diverse 
indigenous groups and the Canadian government. The former touches on the territorial 
independence achieved and the concomitant mineral rights held by indigenous groups, 
while the latter addresses the narrow, resource-driven policy frameworks through 
which many governmental actors view a large part of northern Canada. Moreover, it is 
large-scale mining projects that offer one of the only prospects of secure and medium 
term wage-labour to members of local communities.      
18
 Ibid. 
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resource extraction and community-appropriate norms of consultation; the 
instrumentalization of new media technologies and the existential stakes of certain 
cultural formations; as well as the need for “transparent” modes of 
communication and local forms of governance. In many ways, the DID and the 
AIN mark the typically grey ethical shapes that certain forms of de-colonizing 
knowledge production can take: preserving and disseminating knowledges of 
longevity and situation while mediating new relationships with one’s land-as-
territory, as well as the adaptable ontologies and futural markets that it contains.     
  The DID network is an example of an infrastructural project that, at once, 
facilitates the development of such extractive industries as iron ore mining, while 
also creating a sense of pan-community-scale cohesion by enabling Inuktitut-
language programming and information-sharing to bind geographically distinct 
communities together. On March 18, 2014, the Nunavut Impact Review Board 
(NIRB) approved the Baffinland Iron Ore Mines Corporation’s Early Revenue 
Phase Proposal (ERPP).19 This was the second phase of the consultation process, 
as the NIRB had already given its approval to the Mary River Project Proposal, 
which outlined Baffinland’s intention of reclaiming an already existing mine site 
at Mary River, as well as building a one hundred and fifty kilometre railway to a 
newly built mine port at Steensby Inlet. The main purpose of the ERPP review 
was to ascertain the mine’s potential effects on the region’s surrounding 
ecosystem and socio-economic conditions. Along with a host of other federal and 
territorial governmental agencies, such as Environment Canada, Transport 
Canada, and the Pond Inlet Hunters and Trappers Organization, the NIRB also 
consulted with local residents through Isuma’s DID network, granting Kanuk and 
Isuma TV intervenor status.20 The NIRB’s report emphasizes that Kanuk and 
Isuma TV wanted to see international human rights standards be integrated into 
Baffinland’s corporate responsibility policies.21 It credits Kanuk with facilitating a 
wide spectrum of public participation, and for ensuring that a mine project-
specific web portal will “support oral Inuktitut communications.”22  
The DID doubles as both an economic and cultural facilitator, and the 
disseminator of a dialogue-based method that strives to create a mediated form of 
Aajiiqatigiingniq (deciding together), Inuit consensus building. It employs what 
could be thought of as a strategy of infrastructural opportunism in that the 
                                                        
19
 “Public Hearing Report: Mary River Project: Early Revenue Phase Proposal,” Nunavut 
Impact Review Board, accessed March 22, 2014, http://www.isuma.tv/sites/ 
default/files/attachments/140317-08mn053nirb_12_8_2_public_hearing_report-
oede.pdf. 
20
 Ibid., 11. 
21
 Ibid., 52. 
22
 Ibid., 52.  
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network gained a foothold in local communities by taking advantage of the slow 
and costly bandwidth connections that are prevalent. It largely functions as an 
extensive intranet that incorporates some modes of two-way communication, with 
the backbone of the network reliant on Isuma TV Inuktitut-language 
programming. Yet whom does this process serve? According to the DID, its 
constituencies include: 
lawyers who are solicited to deliver vast amounts of complex 
information in clear terms; company representatives that are 
struggling to understand the people, the culture and the challenges 
relating to land they are seeking to mine; governments and 
international organizations that are required to monitor and 
regulate land development and other indigenous peoples that face 
similar situations on their homelands and who can replicate the 
DID model in their own community.23  
These layers of facilitation all rely on the DID’s infrastructural intervention into 
the consensus building process, as well as into the pre-existing forms of mediatic 
organization specific to the Inuit communities surrounding Mary’s River. Isuma 
TV filled an infrastructural gap left by a lack of adequate telecommunications 
systems in this part of the Arctic, and in filling that gap, incorporated a media-
centric network that could both bolster Inuktitut-language use, ties, and 
presumably generational sharing, and facilitate forms of community-consultation 
that such extractive industries must rely on to gain territorial and federal 
regulatory approval. As Paul Edwards contends, infrastructures co-construct “the 
conditions of modernity.”24 In doing so, these infrastructures actively intervene in 
the production of comprehensive sociotechnical systems that facilitate the 
circulation of given ideologies, whether of micro-scale cultural development or 
resource extraction and use.  
What the DID signals is how infrastructural relation can render operative a 
cross section of actors that are all implicated in the unequal standards of a 
telecommunications system. Rendering them “modern” entails renegotiating the 
terms by which a shifting sense of indigeneity can conform to emergent land-use 
practices, with these last often stemming from structural dependencies that make 
such (extractive) outcomes seem like inevitable ones. Here, “being” indigenous 
means being beholden to an infrastructural opportunism that implies connective 
ties to cultural and economic forms of participation that equally contain: the past, 
                                                        
23
 Digital Indigenous Democracy, “About”. 
24
 Paul Edwards, “Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in 
the History of Sociotechnical Systems,” Modernity and technology, Thomas J. Misa, 
Phillip Brey, and Andrew Feenberg, eds. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 186. 
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as consensus building, the present, as mediating, language-based participation, 
and the future, as emergent relationships to the land.        
         
---- 
 
Satellite Futures 
 
Another latent interpretation of that now infamous photo op that Prime Minister 
Harper anchored, is that of the ways in which it flagged the profound disparities 
between southern and northern standards of communications infrastructure. Over 
the past twenty years or so, the infrastructural “digital divide” between these two 
distinct and unevenly populated regions has been perpetuated by the high cost of 
media connectivity in such places as the Arctic. While Operation Nanook signaled 
the need for an improved local telecommunications infrastructure in Iqaluit, its 
improvement was geared towards its eventual instrumentalization by military and 
other government departments in the perpetuation of Canadian sovereignty claims 
in the Arctic.  
One outcome of Operation Nanook’s communications failure was the 
Arctic Communications Infrastructure Assessment Report (ACIA) published in 
April of 2011. It was funded by the Canadian Northern Economic Development 
Agency, and sought to address the development and continued improvement of 
communications infrastructures in the Arctic for the 21st Century. Although the 
ACIA largely focused on the infrastructural needs of government departments and 
services, with emergency response and military strategy figuring prominently, it 
made a number of significant recommendations that framed communications for 
residents of the Arctic as “a matter of survival.”25 The ACIA report noted how, at 
present, “[t]here is currently no comprehensive strategy for connecting all Arctic 
communities to the level of service required within communities or between 
communities,” equally across the Northwest Territories, the Yukon, and 
Nunavut.26  
With this disparity at the forefront of the report’s findings, its first 
recommendation called for government and corporate actors to readily commit to 
service parity across Arctic communities, as well as to ensure minimum 
connectivity standards for all Arctic communities to equal those offered in 
southern metropolitan centres, thus ensuring service parity across the entirety of 
                                                        
25
 “A Matter of Survival: Arctic Communications Infrastructure in the 21st Century,” 
Northern Communications & Information Systems Working Group, April 30, 2011, 
accessed March 12, 2014, http://www.aciareport.ca/resources/acia_full-v1.pdf, 9.  
26
 Ibid., 10. 
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Canada’s territory, regardless of geographic location.27  Given that the federal 
government has been the single largest purchaser of bandwidth in the Arctic, the 
ACIA also recommended that the government outline an Arctic-specific 
communications strategy to lower the cost of bandwidth and to address the severe 
shortage of bandwidth in communities served by both terrestrial (microwave and 
fibre optic) and satellite telecommunications systems. Finally, the report 
addressed the strengthening of essential communication services in the Arctic, 
seeking to create redundancies across the developing network in order to 
eliminate the possibility of blackouts and prolonged gaps in service, especially in 
emergency response type situations. Overall, the ACIA frames the Arctic as a 
location-specific market that cannot sustain important levels of corporate 
competition, and that, for the near future at least, is reliant on satellite-dependent 
telecommunications systems.  
 The rural Arctic’s (extra-metropolitan Yukon, the Northwest Territories, 
and the entirety of Nunavut) reliance on what is, in essence, a monopolistic form 
of service provision by Telesat Canada, a privately owned company, means they 
are linked to a single type of privatized media connection that is both highly 
centralized and poorly regulated. This condition of Arctic “rurality” is in part 
defined by the lack of road infrastructure that connects many of these 
communities. This absence, that essentially (financially and infrastructurally) 
precludes the possibility of large-scale fibre optic or microwave forms of service 
delivery, makes satellite latency an important issue. As the ACIA notes, with 
delays ranging from eight hundred milliseconds to four seconds, such on-line 
services as videoconferencing or certain types of webpage retrieval will not 
work.28 The conjunction between the rural Arctic’s satellite dependency and its 
technical propensity towards latency, makes of rurality a condition of lag across 
several dimensions of tele-connection; ranging from modes of viewership and on-
line/real time participation to broader concerns around community social justice 
issues. For instance, while Operation Nanook marked a system-wide problem for 
the Canadian military’s communications infrastructure, on a more localized scale, 
some people in remote communities who suffer or have suffered from forms of 
domestic violence, fear for their safety because such a basic telecommunications 
service as call-display is unavailable on their phone lines.29 In the context of 
Arctic rurality, the forms of learned membership, to return to Star, that its existing 
infrastructural conditions foster are, by and large, those of a deferred time lag 
caught in the bandwidth capacities of the early 2000s. Yet these practices and 
experiences of lag, as the example noted above indicates, taken in conjunction 
                                                        
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid., 86. 
29
 Ibid., 161.  
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with the structural conditions of satellite-dependency, that are felt just as much 
across modes of cultural production and interaction as strategies for economic 
development, co-construct the real and perceived communicative limits of many 
communities in the Arctic.   
“Despite the centrality of satellite technologies and services in so many 
aspects of contemporary life,” as Lisa Parks and James Schwoch write, “the 
histories and practices key to these systems and services remain, by comparison to 
other means of global electronic information and entertainment, relatively 
unknown to most observers.”30 For Arctic residents, government personnel, and 
various scales of commercial actors, satellites are in fact front of mind, and are 
readily seen as contested technological ground. While different satellites perform 
different functions, including earth-observation, communications, and scientific 
(largely physics- and astronomy-related) data collection, without, as the ACIA 
notes, a comprehensive Arctic communications infrastructure strategy, each 
function remains in its own regulatory and policy vacuum. A new initiative put 
forward by the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) is trying to serve the High Arctic 
region through the Polar Communications and Weather Mission. This would 
comprise the deployment of two satellites operating in a highly elliptical orbit that 
targets the High Arctic; unlike the majority of geostationary satellites that orbit 
the earth along its equatorial plane.31 The CSA’s mission goals bring together 
both communications and meteorological improvements which range across 
operational capacities for federal departments with Arctic interests, the facilitation 
of natural resource exploration and exploitation, the enhancement of “connectivity 
of northern communities to the broadband information backbone infrastructure,” 
and the provision of “high-quality operational data” to assess meteorological 
phenomena.32 The conflation of all these interests demonstrates to what extent 
satellites can act as generative objects of inquiry that, following Parks and 
Schwoch, “necessitate revisiting communication theories of time/space and the 
very definition of ‘media’ itself.”33  
Satellite dependency is a condition that brings forward not only the 
competing, and seemingly at odds, group of actors in what could be thought of as 
the connection economies of the Arctic, but also manifests the differing forms of 
ontological presence that are emergent in the Arctic at present. From high-
resolution meteorological capture, to data destined for natural gas exploration, to 
strengthening Arctic sovereignty claims by enabling long-term, futural lines of 
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connection between and beyond indigenous lands, all these presences are captured 
within the complex of functions that satellites offer. With the subsidy that 
Industry Canada currently provides Nunavut Broadband Corporation’s Qiniq 
telecommunications network set to expire by 2016, Telesat Canada also seems 
willing to acknowledge that the problem is just as much economic as technical. In 
a 2012 interview, Jim Bush, then vice-president of Telesat claimed that “[w]e 
don’t have to build anything. The satellites exist today to [address the 
telecommunications gap between North and South]. There is a perception that 
there is no capacity available in the North. That’s absolutely not true. The 
challenge is an economic one, not technical.”34 While the CSA’s PCW project 
partly contradicts and supersedes Bush’s claim, it also conceals the fact that 
regulatory regimes could enable more equitable forms of telecommunications 
access. The ACIA report, in searching for best-practice models, flags the 
government of Australia’s establishment of a minimum standard of service of 12 
MB/s. The Australian National Broadband Network, with an investment of $43 
billion (AUS) over eight years, aims to build a comprehensive backbone network 
of both satellite and fibre optic infrastructure that will foster forms of dispersed 
competition as corporate actors will have access to the public network.35 These 
sorts of enabling infrastructure strategies also have the effect of shaping the forms 
of presence that can take shape in such remote regions.  
It is telling that the ACIA does indeed deem Arctic communications 
infrastructure “a matter of survival.” “A sovereign Canadian Arctic requires 
Canadian citizens to live in it,” as the report’s authors programmatically note. 
“Resource exploration and extraction is made affordable in part because of the 
presence of communities with airstrips, hotels, and local workers. The military 
relies on a network of Rangers to patrol much of the Arctic. These national efforts 
require national support.”36 In this case, infrastructure begets infrastructure. Yet 
the social ontologies underpinning these infrastructural processes are also 
evolving in tandem. “Living” in the Arctic clearly means different things to 
different people. Lines of connection can be drawn and redrawn, equally across 
national claims, territorial lands, and an ever-expanding orbit of entrenched 
interests. The satellite bands, microwaves, and fibre optic cables that are being 
newly built and contested will, at once, both conceal and symbolize to what extent 
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the Arctic is a highly networked environment where people not only survive, but 
live the experiences of satellite-dependency, tele time lag, and infrastructural 
opportunism.         
      
---- 
 
Tele-, comb. form 
 
1. (Before a vowel properly tel-, but more often in the full form), repr. Greek 
τηλε-, combining form of τῆλε afar, far off; used in numerous (chiefly recent) 
scientific and technical terms, mostly denoting or connected with special 
appliances or methods for operating over long distances; also in several terms 
connected with psychical research, denoting actions or impressions produced at a 
distance from the exciting cause, independently of the normal means of 
communication.37 
 
---- 
 
Incidental Connection 
 
After the devastating 1999 avalanche in Kangiqsualujjuaq, Nunavik, a coroner’s 
report recommended that many Arctic communities should have at least one 
satellite phone for use in emergencies. In the immediate aftermath of the 
avalanche, residents faced overloaded long-distance telephone lines (all sixteen of 
them) when attempting to place calls to emergency responders in other 
communities. As such, the report also recommended the creation of long-distance 
telephone lines dedicated to emergency services.38 As is so often the case, it took 
disaster with a human toll to reveal the tenuous reliability of telecommunications 
connections between such remote communities and better-provisioned centres to 
the south. In Inukjuak, in 2012, there were sixteen long-distance lines for a 
population of two thousand people. Today, many emergency organizations are 
forced to make appeals via public radio to ask someone to hang up to free a line to 
address the emergency situation at hand. The question of satellite dependency 
returns as the majority of northern telephone traffic moves through the limited 
number of currently orbiting satellites. This minimal level of service, that the 
ACIA report addressed across internet and telephone connections, makes Arctic 
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communities into figurative satellites of a kind in their own right—seemingly 
caught in their own territorial orbits with costly, unreliable, and low speed forms 
of connection between them.  
 On October 30, 2012, Arctic Fibre Inc. announced an amendment to their 
plan to install an undersea fibre optic cable connecting London, New York, and 
Tokyo, with a crucial segment of the cable passing through the Canadian Arctic.39 
The amendment sought to have a backbone connection of the cable pass through 
the eastern edge of Hudson Bay from Cape Dorset to Kuujjuaraapik and 
Chisasibi.40 From there, the cable would go through James Bay Cree territory and 
continue on to Montreal and New York. The advantage of having the backbone of 
the cable pass through this part of the Canadian Arctic lies in its reducing the 
distance between Tokyo and New York by several hundred kilometres, thus 
providing the trading networks that sign on to Arctic Fibre’s cable system with 
profitable micro-temporalities that could lead to market gains. Along with the 
backbone connection, Arctic Fibre is proposing a series of spur lines that could 
benefit communities in Nunavik and Nunavut, as well as the James Bay Cree. 
Madeleine Redfern, the former mayor of Iqaluit, whose consulting firm undertook 
regulatory and land claims agreements on behalf of Arctic Fibre upon leaving 
office, noted that the main backbone proposed by Arctic Fibre would connect 
fifty-two percent of Nunavut’s population to the more reliable and higher speed 
fibre optic system. Arctic Fibre is looking for provincial and federal governments 
to contribute one hundred and sixty-one million dollars to create spur lines for the 
communities adjacent to the backbone.41  
By July of 2013, Arctic Fibre was organizing a series of community 
meetings set for late August in the seven locations along the proposed backbone 
connection in Nunavut.42 The company was after local knowledge and input in 
determining the most appropriate landing sites for the cable spurs, taking into 
account ice conditions, distance from common anchorages, and wildlife migration 
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routes, amongst other factors. During one of these August meetings at the Hotel 
Arctic in Iqaluit, Doug Cunningham, president and CEO of Arctic Fibre, said “I 
think there’s a lot that can happen in this community and I think we are creating a 
great public service that will be a great economic driver.”43 Earlier in the day, 
Cunningham and a group from Arctic Fibre took Iqaluit community leaders to the 
proposed landing site of the cable at Apex beach, on the outskirts of the town. The 
site lies just beyond the access road that leads down to the beach, and would have 
the cable make landfall at the foot of a few fading Hudson’s Bay Co. buildings. 
Arctic Fibre officials assured Iqaluit’s community leaders that the cable would be 
covered with a protective shield over the entirety of its length running along the 
tidal flats, with the cable itself laid in a submerged trench in order to ensure that it 
would not be damaged by ice-scouring. The officials claimed that the only visible 
infrastructure at the site itself would be the covered manhole needed to receive the 
cable.44 In order to gain the necessary cable landing licenses from the federal 
government, Arctic Fibre first had to go through the approval processes of the 
Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB) and the Nunavut Planning Commission 
(NPC). On January 23, 2014, the NIRB announced that Arctic Fibre’s project did 
not require an environmental hearing, but imposed fifty-two terms and conditions 
primarily touching on the protection of local ecologies.45 According to Arctic 
Fibre, construction of the project will begin in May 2014.46 
Arctic Fibre, in foregrounding its apparent “Arcticness,” is placing a 
certain emphasis on this middle ground of the fibre optic infrastructure’s systemic 
coverage. By taking the undersea cable through the Northwest Passage, Arctic 
Fibre is laying claim to a very tangible form of infrastructural connection 
predicated on the reduction of distances and times, and, by extension, the 
associated political economic benefits that can be derived from such a reduction. 
According to Arctic Fibre, the six hundred and twenty million dollar project is to 
be primarily financed by the emergent Asian, largely Chinese, broadband and 
cellular markets, who are increasingly after G3 and G4 services. “It is 
international carriers who are paying the freight here,” Cunningham claims. “Our 
leading tenants will be the Chinese top three telephone companies. Third [sic] will 
be South Korea, then the Japanese and the Taiwanese.” 47  In this calculus, 
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Nunavut and Nunavik would seem to be getting all the benefits of an incidental 
connection—an infrastructural geography that just so happens, for reasons of 
present and future economic expediency and profitability, to pass through their 
territories. According to Arctic Fibre, a single unit of satellite bandwidth, 
equivalent to a gigabit, provided by Telesat Canada can cost Arctic consumers up 
to two thousand five hundred dollars at present. By way of contrast, that same 
amount of data delivered via the proposed fibre optic cable would cost between 
one hundred and one hundred and twenty dollars within three years. 48  What 
Arctic Fibre would seem to be bringing to these Arctic communities are direct, 
quasi-immediate connections across internet-, television-, and telephone-
platforms, all at a lower cost. In this schematic plan, latency would no longer be 
an issue. Local residents would be living in tandem, both in and at the same 
temporalities as Canadian communities to the south—their time lag would 
disappear, equally across digital as well as material realities.  
While the Arctic Fibre proposal has also met with substantial opposition 
from corporate and government interests in Nunavut with an investment in 
satellite telecommunications systems, notably from the SSI group, a Yellowknife-
based company that owns Qiniq Internet, one of the principal service providers in 
Nunavut, it nonetheless marks the emergence, for the first time, of a potentially 
reliable telecommunications infrastructure in the Arctic. Yet this seemingly 
beneficial and anodyne quality of fibre optic infrastructural “reliability,” also 
signals the emergence and slow concretization of corporate and government 
actors that had, by dint of circumstance, neglect, disconnect(ion), and self-
interest, left these Arctic communities to their own (ontological) devices. The 
ACIA report makes this clear by framing equal-access to broadband as first and 
foremost a military and emergency-response problem, and from there, addressing 
a long list of new federal needs across a number of departments and programs, 
from the Canadian Coast Guard and Corrections Canada, to Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada and NavCanada; while also, and somewhat incidentally, providing 
a real and symbolic series of media connections to Arctic residents. These 
governmental “needs,” which range from building a new port for military use, the 
development of permanent military ground stations to monitor satellite data 
transfer, and on to the implementation of an Environment Emergency 
Management System (E2MS) at a northern site, or providing support to the future 
distribution of “status cards” in local communities, they all signal the expansion 
of an infrastructural governmentality that can instrumentalize incidental 
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connections such as spur lines.  
This governmentality is an instrument that is shaping the ongoing lives of 
indigenous residents in Arctic communities. It presupposes that the mere fact of 
indigenous land claims and local forms of government have righted the not so 
post-colonial imbalance between the exigencies of site-specific northern 
communities and the interests of a more diffuse group of global corporate and 
government actors that simultaneously extend both social services as well as 
forms of social sanction that often reorient or negate the stated interests of Arctic 
residents. Here it is important to examine, following Star and Ruhleder, the ways 
in which the projection of futural (and existing) infrastructural systems can lay 
claim to sited ecological-relational practices. Infrastructural “connection,” in 
being incidental, raises questions around the attendant and often unforeseen 
relationships that these forms of connection will build in such regions as the 
Arctic. By consulting with Nunavut’s residents and community leaders to 
determine where best to place the cable, Arctic Fibre is merely promoting, 
producing, and ultimately concealing the “existing visibilities” of its 
infrastructural system, and thereby sanctioning their intervention into these 
communities’ material environments. 49  Moreover, these “negotiations of 
visibility” should include the political and cultural subjectivities that are co-
shaping what “connection” means in their lives.50 Thus, in this optic, a “politics of 
infrastructural visibility” for the Arctic can also make sense of the mutually 
enabling relational interconnections between resource extraction and government 
services that underpin the development of telecommunications infrastructure.51  
It is in this sense that the building of the Arctic Fibre undersea cable is 
also an “environmental” issue, in that it points to the ways in which indigenous 
communities still retain vital if morphing connections to the land.52 This is not to 
claim that this connection exists as a metaphysics, but rather that it is an evolving 
worldview that has not yet received appropriate or extensively formalized 
political, economic, and cultural forms of recognition. The incidence of the 
connection, in this reading, becomes a form of “slow violence” in that it touches 
on the important ways in which projects of infrastructural connection, much like 
environmental catastrophes such as climate change, “present formidable 
representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act 
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decisively.”53 When a telecommunications infrastructure is deemed “essential,” a 
“matter of survival,” whether for the support and perpetuation of military 
activities, emergency response, or corporate action, the attendant social 
relationships that get built out from its seemingly inevitable implementation need 
to be examined for inequalities by asking who will benefit, how, and when? “We 
need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way 
we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions,” Rob Nixon writes.54 
When it comes to infrastructure in the Arctic, incidental connection may be just 
such an affliction. 
  
----  
Friction 
Friction emerges. Anna Tsing’s conceptualizing of a metaphorical “friction” is a 
useful device for slowing down subject-object relations in a given time and space. 
This shifting of speeds, when it comes to Arctic telecommunications 
infrastructures, is important as the infrastructural pace of northern development is 
framed in terms of being both urgent and overdue—“catching up with the times” 
can sometimes conceal much. To examine such diverse actors as the Digital 
Indigenous Democracy project, Telesat Canada, and Arctic Fibre Inc., requires 
investing in a politics of the delay that is an attempt to understand how 
communities can and do come to cohere in a non-teleological fashion. This delay 
could be a situation specific to late capitalism, in that communities, especially 
those in supposedly remote regions, seem under greater pressure to succumb to 
international networks of trade, particularly around natural resource economies 
dependent on fluctuating production cycles.  
To move out of the teleology of “development,” “connection,” and 
“economic progress,” is not to sidestep the evolution of a networked, non-
essentialized indigeneity that is in constant flux in Arctic communities. Rather, it 
is to acknowledge that there are real, metaphorical, and ontological frictions that 
adhere to the implementation of telecommunications systems that are framed as 
being equitably beneficial across the spectrum of a societal conjuncture. This 
recognition could make more room for thinking about the discursive and political 
instabilities of post-colonial infrastructures that go beyond dams and roads, and 
can begin to incorporate telecommunications systems reliant on satellites, fibre 
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optic cables, and microwave transmitters.55 Thinking about these infrastructures 
as part of a post-colonial spatial politics for the present might also, on the level of 
method, call for more experimentation and cross-disciplinary affiliations. Lisa 
Parks and Nicole Starosielski have foregrounded the open methodological 
questions and possibilities raised by the study of communications infrastructure, 
yet these are, precisely, generous and open questions that are calling for more 
attention and generative forms of scholarly practice that attend to the temporal, 
social, and phenomenological conditions of emergence and lag that many 
indigenous communities are grappling with today.  
In working through a series of “tele field notes” in this essay, I wanted to 
acknowledge how forms of fieldwork inspired by, if not strictly adhering to, 
anthropological methodologies might offer just such generative practices that can 
allow for the site-specificities of infrastructural connections to emerge. These 
field notes “at a distance” have prepared the ground for my undertaking 
“fieldwork” (of a kind) throughout the Canadian Arctic in order let these 
emergent cases of friction cohere across the continuum of actors involved in a 
literal “broadband” of sited interests. This bridging of distance, and, in the 
process, spending time in the thick of the Arctic’s infrastructural moment, is 
important in that it not only complements the documentary and mediating biases 
of reports, the news media, scholarly production, etc., but also, for the 
communications scholar in particular, allows for understanding to potentially 
come into being through, if not participant-observation, then a sited experiential 
dimension that might disrupt the often stabilizing semiotic and political narratives 
of the Canadian telecommunications industry.56 This method has a marginal if 
both recent and relatively distant tradition in the study of Canadian 
communications, with the latter perhaps best embodied in Harold Innis’ “dirt 
research.”57 Yet how, unlike in Innis’ smoothly dense descriptions of incremental 
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and decisive societal change, to make the “dirt” show?58 In other words, how to 
allow for the contest of subject-object relationship making to be captured with a 
valence approaching that of a discursive documentary photograph? How to 
describe living emergent frictions? 
 
 Paul Rabinow, in a 2007 Preface to Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco, 
a “classic” of scholarly anthropological literature originally published in 1977, 
looks back to when he started writing the book and how at that time ethnographic 
fieldwork, while an obligatory “rite de passage” for every anthropologist, had 
more or less attained the status of a taken-for-granted method.59  It was what 
anthropologists did. Reflections caused a scandal amongst anthropologists 
because in it Rabinow lifted the veil on how, why, and under what circumstances 
the anthropologist conducted fieldwork. He turned a documentary lens on the 
natures of anthropological fieldwork and in the process quite literally showed 
what values cohered in “being-there.” While Rabinow has since turned to a more 
Foucauldian engagement with the anthropologization of philosophy,60 this early 
work is valuable here because it shows that “fieldwork” is not a constrained or 
circumscribed practice. Rabinow’s “fieldwork” renders the marks of its making 
visible. As such, to write a politics of infrastructural visibility into being for the 
Arctic requires living its infrastructures’ social practices and sited technologies. 
This entails going beyond the visual in order to document how such phenomena 
as bandwidth speed, data delays, and other communicative marks of incidental 
connection are lived across communities in the Arctic by asking: how are 
infrastructures peopled? It also entails going there, not as an observant outsider, 
but as one more relation in the field of actors, issues, interests, and geographies 
that are co-shaping an infrastructural relationality that is fast becoming 
unproblematically indigenous.     
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